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The Communist Movement in Russia Today
Summary
The Russian communist movement today consists of the large Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation (CPRF), which holds 10% of the seats in the State Duma and claims over 500,000 
members, and a handful of smaller extra-parliamentary communist parties which have harshly 
denounced the CPRF for its emphasis on legality and Russian nationalism. Attacks by these 
extremist CPs as well as mounting popular opposition to unremitting stagflation and the 
Chechen War may account for the CPRF's recent turn to the left. In the political program 
approved at its Third Congress in January 1995, party chairman Gennadii Ziuganov's 
ethnocentric Russian nationalism took a back seat to a more traditionalist, if updated, version of 
Marxism-Leninism. Overall, if compared to non-ruling CPs in Western Europe before the Soviet 
collapse, the CPRF most resembles the French Communist "red Gaullists".
The Communist Movement on the Eve of the Forthcoming December Elections
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), far and away the largest of the half dozen or 
so post-Soviet  communist  parties operating in Russia today,  is the  only one represented  in  the  State 
Duma, or lower house of the Russian parliament. As of mid-1995, indications from public opinion polls 
and on-the-scene analysts suggest that in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, scheduled for Decem-
ber 1995, the CPRF will win substantially more than its December 1993 share of some 13% of the party 
list vote. Its May 1995 victory in a by-election for a vacant Duma seat in the Moscow Region points in 
the same direction.  An assessment of the CPRF's political  profile is therefore of more than academic 
interest.
One of the  most important  questions to ask is the extent  to which the  CPRF  has moved beyond the 
Leninist character of the old Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) toward a West European form 
of social democracy. Bluntly stated, is its present accommodation to the "democratic rules of the game" a 
political  maneuver  or  a  lasting  commitment  in  principle?  Any  attempt  to  address  this  question  is 
complicated by the fact that the CPRF's rhetoric may be influenced by its adversarial relationship with 
the  more radical,  extra-parliamentary Russian CPs.  Indeed,  there  is a  kind  of dialectical  interaction 
between these more extremist communist groups and the parliamentary CPRF as all of them vie for the 
allegiance of a growing constituency of Russian citizens alienated from the Yeltsin government and in-
creasingly receptive to welfare state programs. The competition among the neo-communists has led the 
extra-parliamentary parties, for example, to reverse their 1993 policy of boycotting elections, while the 
CPRF may voice a more radical line than it would otherwise espouse.
The  Extra-parliamentary CPs  versus  the Communist  Party of  the  Russian  Federation 
(CPRF)
Relations between the CPRF and the more leftist CPs were not always so hostile. At the CPRF's 
founding in mid-February 1993, when it declared itself the successor to the Communist Party of the 
Russian Socialist Federation (Russian Soviet  Federative Socialist Republic) at a so-called Second 
Extraordinary Congress, almost all the leaders of the other neo-communist formations were present. 
Indeed, each was competing for the political soul of the still undefined, malleable CPRF. Any number 
of divergent views were expressed, ranging from the assertions by Valentin Kuptsov (who headed the 
RSFSR Communist Party just prior to the August 1991 coup) that "only fools or adventurers" would 
support the immediate reconstitution of the USSR and that the party must fight against "dogmatism, 
in particular against the absolutization of force", to Richard Kosolapov's view that "the party, having 
purged  itself  of  opportunists,  ought  to  also  purge  itself  of  semi-opportunists."1 Furthermore, 
representatives of many outlooks found their way on to the 89-member Central Executive Committee of 
the new party under a proviso that permitted dual party membership for one year. Until the autumn of 
1993, therefore, the rivalry among the post-Soviet CPs was confined to behind-the-scenes squabbling as 
the  new  CPRF  chairman,  Gennadii  Ziuganov,  sought  to  mold  his  party  into  a  distinct  political-
ideological formation.
This would all  change with Boris Yeltsin's late  September 1993  dissolution of the Soviet-era Russian 
parliament and call for elections to a new Federal Assembly and a simultaneous constitutional referen-
dum in December. Ziuganov directed CPRF members to shun the use of force in defense of the old par-
liament and to participate in the elections for the new one. The more radical CPs, in contrast, backed the 
armed clashes launched on October 3, 1993,  by the diehard defenders of the old parliament and subse-
quently boycotted the constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections held on December 12, 1993.  
Two weeks after the CPRF garnered 10% (45 out of 450) seats in the new State Duma, moreover, the 
extra-parliamentary CPs moved to create a Union of Russian Communists, known as the  Roskomsoiuz, 
which was resolutely opposed to  any kind  of accommodation with the  evolving constitutional  order. 
Ziuganov declined to attend the meeting. And in early March 1994 the Roskomsoiuz leadership council 
declared  that  "the  tomorrow of the  Russian communist  movement  is not  tied  to  the  Ziuganov line."2 
Thenceforth relations between the CPRF and the Roskomsoiuz group sharply deteriorated.
Among the  Roskomsoiuz members was a  "Leninist  Platform" faction within the  CPRF  itself,  led  by 
Richard  I. Kosolapov (a  pre-perestroika establishment  scholar  and  Marxist  theorist),  as well  as four 
separate neo-communist parties. All formed in late 1991 or early 1992, they included: the intransigently 
1 Glasnost', No. 7 (133), 18-24 February 1993, pp. 2-3.
2 Golos kommunista, No. 3(7), March 1994; quoted in Raznogolositsa (INION RAN), No. 11, 21-27 March 1994, p. 3.
Stalinist  All-Union  Communist  Party  of  Bolsheviks,  led  by  former  Leningrad  school  teacher  Nina 
Andreeva;  the orthodox Brezhnevite  Union  of  Communists (later  to become the  Russian  Communist  
Party - CPSU) led by Aleksei Prigarin; the militant street-wise Russian Communist Workers' Party led 
by Victor Anpilov in Moscow and V. Tiul'kin in St.  Petersburg; and the "new left"  Russian  Party of  
Communists, which had its origins in the CPSU's 1990-1991 Marxist Platform faction and was led by 
Anatolii Kriuchkov.
Initially joined together by a common animus toward the Yeltsin Constitution, the Roskomsoiuz members 
soon focused  their  wrath on the  CPRF,  bitterly  denouncing the  constructive  role  its deputies played 
during the  State  Duma's first session (January-July 1994)  as well  as Ziuganov's ever more outspoken 
"Great Russian" nationalism. What was at stake in this growing conflict, in addition to strategic differ-
ences, was competition for the allegiance of the 450,000 active rank-and-file communists said to have 
been represented at the February 1993 CPRF Congress. At that time this putative membership "pool" was 
not locked  into any one specific  neo-communist orientation. By 1994,  however, the CPRF's electoral 
success was beginning to have a bandwagoning effect, with its bona fide dues-paying members increasing 
and the ranks of the Roskomsoiuz parties thinning out.1
The radical CPs thus launched a polemical and organizational attack against Ziuganov and the CPRF in 
the spring of 1994.  In an "Open Letter to G.A. Ziuganov" published in the journals of the Prigarin and 
Kriuchkov parties,  one Boris F.  Slavin questioned  Ziuganov's rejection of the  core  Marxist  tenets of 
proletarian internationalism and class struggle and his support instead for state patriotism and the nine-
teenth-century Russian Slavophile notion of sobornost' (best translated as "populist collectivism"). While 
his arguments were reasoned rather than polemical,  his basic point was unequivocal:  Ziuganov's views 
amounted to right-wing opportunism.2 Slavin was a key player in the developing intra-communist feud. A 
co-founder  of  Kriuchkov's  Russian  Party  of  Communists,  Slavin  had  led  two-thirds  of  that  party's 
followers into the CPRF in February 1993 and had himself become a member of its Central Executive 
Committee.  He had hoped thereby to influence the evolution of the CPRF's policies from within.3 His 
decision to attack Ziuganov publicly in May 1994 thus pointed to considerable tension and disagreement 
within the ranks of the CPRF itself.
Meanwhile,  Prigarin's  Union  of  Communists,  which had  ordered  its members to renounce their  joint 
membership in the CPRF back in December 1993, sought to split the CPRF's local Moscow organization 
by creating a rival "Moscow City Organization of the CPSU" in early April 1994. 4 This organizational 
challenge, while numerically insignificant (the new city unit siphoned off fewer than 5% of the CPRF's 
Moscow members)5, underscored the depth of the escalating rivalry between the CPRF and its ultra-leftist 
opponents. This, in turn, was reflected in the composition and leadership of yet another neo-communist 
formation, the Union of Communist Parties - CPSU (UCP-CPSU). As if the Russian communist playing 
field were not already crowded enough, in late March 1993 Oleg Shenin, last organizational secretary of 
1 By January  1995 the  CPRF  claimed  530,000 members  representing  all 88 regions  of  Russia  and  20,000 primary  party 
organizations.  By late 1994 the  Russian  Communist  Workers'  Party's  membership  had  fallen from 80,000 to  40,000 rep-
resenting 51 regions  (Pravda, December  21, 1994), that  of  the  Union of  Communists  from 10,000 to  some  five to  seven 
thousand (author's interview with Aleksei Prigarin, November 3, 1994); the other CPs had even fewer members than Prigarin's 
group. More concrete data are unavailable. With regard to party size, however, the distinction between dues-paying members 
and unaffiliated sympathizers is important to bear in mind since the latter outnumber the former. For example, on Victory Day, 
May 9, 1995, in Moscow alone some 300,000 people paraded under one or another communist party banner in the so-called 
"alternative"  march  (author's  first-hand  assessment  and  consultations  with  informed  observers.)  Western  news  services, 
preoccupied with the official celebration on Red Square and the military parade on Poklonnaia Gora, reported an opposition 
turnout of only some 30,000.
2 Golos kommunista, No. 6, May 1994; see also Mysl', No. 10, 1994.
3 Author's interview with Slavin, May 16, 1995.
4 Golos kommunista, No. 5 (9), April-May 1994.
5 Author's  interview with Prigarin's close associate, Sergei Cherniakhovskii, November 3, 1994. In  autumn  1994 the CPRF's 
Moscow organization had about 19,000 members, the new city unit of the Prigarin-Cherniakhovskii group some 1,500, many of 
whom had never belonged to the CPRF.
the CPSU and one of the August 1991 putchists, had spearheaded the creation of the UCP-CPSU as an 
umbrella  organization  for all  the  reemergent  communist  parties  throughout  the  post-Soviet  successor 
states.1 In July 1994  the CPRF became a full  member of this group (all  the while retaining its policy 
autonomy), while a UCP-CPSU plenum denounced Prigarin's "schismatic activities" and Shenin invited 
him to withdraw from the party's Political Executive Committee.2
The  CPRF's  Political  Profile:  From  Great  Russian  Nationalism  to  Updated  Marxism-
Leninism
The CPRF's response to the ultra-leftists' attack took several forms. First of all, rather than engaging 
in  explicit,  personalized  counter-polemics,  the  CPRF  leaders  publicly  dismissed  their  leftist 
challengers as inconsequential sectarians. As Ziuganov put it in his concluding speech to the party's 
Third Congress in January 1995, the other CPs, except for the Russian Communist Workers' Party, 
were "simply kruzhki" - or small isolated circles of like-minded thinkers.3 At the same time, the CPRF 
tightened up its organization by directing all supporters to re-register as members of this new post-Soviet 
formation and to pay their party dues accordingly. Only those who did so would be eligible for election 
as  delegates  to  the  party's  Third  Congress  in  January  1995. 4 But  most  important,  the  process  of 
formulating a party program for approval at the Third Congress was opened up in October 1994 to broad 
rank-and-file participation, with 26 different drafts eventually being collated by the program commission. 
The end result was a program that differed substantially from earlier drafts, including the one designated 
at the October 1994 plenum for critical review by the entire party.
Before analyzing the final CPRF program, it should be noted that on certain basic points the parliamen-
tary and extra-parliamentary CPs have always been in agreement. For example, all neo-communists saw 
capitalist development in Russia, with its vast income disparities between rich and poor and its destruc-
tion of the welfare safety net, as a vindication of Marx's writings on the evils of capitalism and the need 
for socialism. There was likewise agreement that the imperialist West, above all the United States, was 
turning Russia into a neo-colonial outpost, a source of raw materials and an export market for manufac-
tured goods. Furthermore, communist moderates as well as extremists attributed the collapse of both the 
old communist order and the Soviet Union to the bourgeoisification and betrayal of the CPSU elite, with 
Gorbachev and Yeltsin the arch villains. These shared views, finally,  led to a common set of ultimate 
goals: the return to socialism, the elimination of Western and American influence, and the reconstitution 
of the Soviet Union.
Where the CPRF first diverged from the radicals was in its insistence on the "peaceful" and "voluntary" 
realization of those goals and its willingness to participate in the democratic process to achieve them. 
Secondly,  from mid-1993 onward party documents were increasingly suffused with Russian nationalist 
thinking. Yet a third distinctive feature of the evolving CPRF program was its commitment to what one 
might call "ecologically correct" Marxism-Leninism, that is, socialist economic development that would 
strike  a balance between environmental  protection and human needs. At the same time,  however, the 
importance - or weight - of each of these particular aspects of the CPRF's political  profile varied over 
time.  Pragmatic  moderation  characterized  the  party's  initial  February  1993  documents.  Unabashed 
ethnocentric  Russian nationalism was the  hallmark  of the  October  1994  version.  And  a  modernized 
variant of traditional  Marxism-Leninism took precedence over pragmatism and nationalism in the pro-
gram officially approved at the January 1995 Congress.
1 By late 1994 the UCP-CPSU included communist organizations from almost all former Soviet Republics, among which the 
United  CP  of  Georgia  claimed  132,000 members,  the  CP  of  Kazakhstan  30,000,  and  the  CP  of  Tadzhikistan  70,000; 
membership figures for the others were unavailable (Glasnost', No. 24-25 (175), 3-17 November 1994). Most Russian CPs were 
also affiliated with the UCP-CPSU.
2 Glasnost', No. 12-13 (169), 29 July - 11 August 1994, pp. 3-5; see also author's interview with Prigarin, November 3, 1994.
3 Text in CPRF Duma fraction's Informatsionnyi biulleten', No. 2(14), February 1, 1995, pp. 23-30.
4 Materialy IX plenuma Tsentral'nogo Ispolnitel'nogo Komiteta KPRF (Moscow, 1994), p. 41.
The contrast between the final CPRF program and the October 1994 draft was striking. On the one hand, 
the latter depicted Russia through the ages - including the Soviet era - as a "unique ethnic community" 
characterized by an innate collectivist ethos and bound together by "a single Slavic nucleus, the Russian 
people, including the greatrus, littlerus and whiterus" (sic). This view, which could hardly be expected to 
facilitate  the goal  of a "voluntary" reconstitution of the Soviet  Union, appeared twice in the October 
1994  version  of  the  program and  was an  integral  part  of  Ziuganov's  worldview.1 All  such  explicit 
expressions of Russian nationalism were eliminated, however, in the final party program.
On the other hand, the official  January 1995  document went far beyond the October 1994  draft's de-
clarative  support for "Marxist-Leninist  teaching" and "democratic  centralism". While  reiterating these 
formulations, the final  program also used traditional  Marxist categories to analyze  at  some length the 
nature of contemporary capitalist exploitation, the class structure of twenty-first century socialist society, 
and the reasons for the Soviet party-state's past errors. Among the latter, the program claimed that the 
effort to "catch up and overtake" the West had led to the faulty emulation of capitalist production norms 
rather than the conservation of natural resources and improvements in the quality of life.2
Allusions to pluralist politics and a mixed economy were also watered down in the final CPRF program. 
Support for multi-party democracy and a "planned-market", mixed economy in the foreseeable future had 
been notable in the CPRF's original February 1993 draft program.3 Such pragmatic moderation was still 
apparent, if to a lesser degree, in the October 1994 draft's defense of "freedom of association in political  
parties  and  social  organizations"  and  endorsement  of  a  mixed  economy  even  under  conditions  of 
communist  participation  in  a  coalition  "government  of  people's  trust".  The  January 1995  document, 
however, omitted the reference to a multi-party system and circumscribed the extent and duration of a 
mixed economy. It did, to be sure, emphasize the use of "legal methods" to establish a "government of 
people's trust". But the function of such a coalition government was to "change the economic course" and 
implement "emergency measures of government regulation". And democratic elections and "freedom of 
speech and political  associations" were approved only in the context of explicit  reference to Yurii  V. 
Andropov's limited 1983 initiatives in these directions. Moreover, the "government of people's trust" was 
viewed as simply the first step in a three-stage transition to socialism, thus suggesting a parallel with the 
East European "people's democraties" of the mid-to-late 1940s.
Reasons for the CPRF's Turn to the Left
Plainly, the CPRF's  programmatic profile had shifted to the left.  Did this mean that the extra-
parliamentary CPs'  polemical  and  organizational campaign was having  an impact?  Or that  the 
Chechen War, on the heels of five years of unremitting economic stagflation, was radicalizing popular 
opposition to the Yeltsin government? And could it be that support for Ziuganov's leadership of the 
party was waning?
Kosolapov - who, significantly, was editor-in-chief of the CPSU's flagship journal Kommunist from 
March 1976 until February 1986 - maintains that he did indeed influence the deliberations on the final 
version of the program.4 The CPRF's new secretary for ideology, Vladimir G. Bindiukov, has corrobo-
rated his claim, adding that Kosolapov is too distinguished a scholar to remain in a party whose program 
he does not support.5 The influence of the Kosolapov wing is further suggested by the  omission in the 
January 1995 program of the October 1994 draft's ban on dual party membership (Kosolapov's "Leninist 
platform" group, it  will be recalled,  was a founding member of the  Roskomsoiuz) as well as the final 
program's more conciliatory approach to inter-CP disputes.
1 Text in ibid., pp. 46-63.
2 Text in III S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi partii Rossiiskoi Federatsii: Materialy i documenty (Moscow: "Informpechat'", 1995), pp. 
96-118.
3 "Politicheskoe zaiavlenie", Sovietskaia Rossiia, March 2, 1993.
4 Author's interview with Kosolapov, May 22, 1995.
Some communist deputies in the State Duma have argued that the program's leftist, Leninist gloss was 
intended only to placate the party's "Stalinists", who were said to comprise some "15 percent" of the total 
membership.6 According to this interpretation, the CPRF's real public policy agenda was set forth 
5 Author's interview with Bindiukov, May 26, 1995. On January 22, 1995, the new CPRF Central Committee and Central Control 
Commission  elected  Ziuganov as  party  chairman,  Kuptsov  as  first  deputy  chairman  and  Aleksandr  Shabanov  as  deputy 
chairman. The plenum also elected a Secretariat of five and a 19-member Presidium that included six deputies of the State 
Duma. Of the Presidium members, only I.I. Mel'nikov, V.P. Peshkov, and S.A. Potapov were also members of the Secretariat; 
the  fifth  secretary was  G.N. Seleznev, editor-in-chief of the  new CPRF weekly newspaper,  Pravda Rossii. Bindiukov and 
Seleznev were also Duma deputies.
6 Author's interviews at State Duma, May 1995.
in Ziuganov's keynote report to the January 1995 Congress. In the final program, to be sure, there was an 
ambiguous effort  to  whitewash Stalin's  role  in  Soviet  history by referring  to  the  CPSU's  "ceaseless 
struggle" against a petty bourgeois, bureaucratic wing within the party itself, a struggle that was said to 
have influenced the conduct of leaders from Stalin to Brezhnev. But Ziuganov's congress report was not 
particularly reassuring either. For after disclosing that the final CPRF program was "born amid stormy 
debates", Ziuganov reaffirmed his vision of the historically distinctive character of Russia, of her innate 
"socialist predisposition". He then hailed some thirty ardent Russian nationalist writers, intellectuals, and 
artists  as  representatives  of  his  land's  "authentic  patriotic  intelligentsia".  His  foreign  policy  views, 
moreover, went far beyond the official program's support for an "independent foreign policy serving the 
national-state  interests". Indeed,  Ziuganov expressed regret  for the  passing of the bipolar  "balance  of 
power", and he called for the "re-establishment of traditional alliance ties in all regions of the world".1 It 
is difficult for the outside observer to see why such ideas would not appeal to older "Stalinists"!
In sum, it  appears that  the CPRF is heading into the campaign for the December 1995  parliamentary 
elections with an updated Marxist-Leninist program for the long haul and a traditional if double-faceted 
communist alliance strategy in the short run. While the official party program seeks allies among center-
left political  parties, Ziuganov also seeks them among "state-patriotic forces". This fundamental  diver-
gence reflects the  existence  of at  least  two substantial  political  currents within the  CPRF,  one more 
Russian chauvinistic and the other more orthodox Marxist-Leninist. Neither, however, evinces any real 
concern  with  constitutionalism,  democratic  pluralism,  or  civil  liberties  as  enduring  principles  under 
socialism.
This is not to say that the CPRF will not observe democratic practices during the forthcoming electoral 
contests  or  even  as a  minority  member  in  a  future  coalition  government.  The  large  postwar French 
Communist  Party  was  rigidly  Marxist-Leninist  in  its  programmatic  stance,  and  became  ever  more 
nationalistic as well, but it did not directly challenge the established democratic order. So, too, the CPRF 
is mobilizing its followers for the ward-level  tasks of campaigning, poll-watching, and getting out the 
vote.2 But at this point in its development, the CPRF's political profile is closer to that of the Andropov-
era  Marxist-Leninist  modernizers  and  the  French  Communist  "red  Gaullists"  than  to  the  social-
democratizing mentality of Gorbachev's  perestroika or the Italian Communist Party in the heyday of 
Eurocommunism.
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1 Text in III S"ezd: Materialy i dokumenty, pp. 8-38.
2 Author's personal observation of a raikom meeting in Moscow, May 18, 1995.
